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DiTERESTS AID PO!...ICIES Iii SOu"T.H:SAS'? ASL\

Commencement Address by Senator !1ue r:.ansfield (D ., l·iontana)
Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan
S\mday,

,Tun~

10, 1962, 4;00 p.m., E.S .T.

I am happy to be with you and grateful for the privilege of joini~

the class of 1962.

It is especially pleasant to be here because of past

coutacts with your faculty and, most especially, vith my old

f~iend, E~nest

Melby, former Chancellor of the University of Montana.
Members of the Michigan S-cate staff are ofte-n encountered in \·:ashington and in the far-flung corners of the world .

I cannot remember the

number of times, for example, that I have run into your Professor He.;;ley
Fisnel

a:::~.d

Togethe~

m..v old colleague

f~om

with the rest of the

Montana, Professo.c Guy l"ox, in Saigon.

t~aining-mission

made important contributions to the

Re~ublic

of Michigan State, they have

of Viet Nam.

As for your Presi-

dent, Dr . Hannah, his travel-mileage on behalf of the nation--and, incidentally, Michigan State--is r ival ed only by that of the Secr etary of State and
Members of Congress .
I have heard i t said that the sun never sets on the faculty of
Michigan State .

It i s reassuring, ther efore, to come here and discover

that the faculty has a natural habitat.

It is such a delightful habitat

one wonders why so many of its members have been persuaded to leave for
the enervating tropics of Asi a and Hashington.
They have been persuaded, I suspect, even as the nation has been
persuaded, to enter into nev channels of i nternational activity, by the
events of the paat two decades .

?he nation has become deeply committed

IR~RT

PACE. 2

I have chosen it, finally, because I suspect you are sufficiently
at this moment not to require an inspirational speecn from me .

ins)~red

rience, I

shall give you what are, in my opinion, the sober facts of one of tnc
situations which confront the Nation, facts to which you are entitled as
mature men and women, as

citize~s

of the United States.
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througilou·~

tile world.

Skilled members of thiz

un:'~ve~s:i.ty

a:e among the

thousands of Americans who are working abroad with great dedication to
d~scharge

that

co~~itment .

It j_s to this commitment, notably, as it is involved in Southeast
Asia which I would

e~dress

your attention .

I have chosen this subje¢t, in

pa=t, becsuse of the close association which has existed between
State and Viet Nam.

~ichig&n

I have chosen it, too, in part because evants appear

to ba moving in Southeast Asia towards a point of critical decision .
As you know,

~e

L J.. ,. _.,f\.t

have recently lacied combat forces in Thailand.

This movement of troops follows the strengt.hening of the United States
uilits=y t4ain1ng mission in Viet Nac.

Both steps repreGent a deepening of

an already very deep involvement on the Southeast Asian mainland .
In this, as in all cases of foreign policy and milita--y
tne responsibility for the direction of the nation's course rests
President .

It is a grave and difficult responsibility .

co~nd,
wi~h

the

In discharging it,

~he

?resident i s entitled to the understanding and support of the nation .

~1.-Y

I say that he has had both in the Senate of the United States, fro:n the

leadership of both parties .

He has kept the Congress fully informed on the

s!.tu&tion as it has developed .

In a

si~~lar

manner he bas tried to keep the

people of the nation informed through his frequent press conferences.
Support of the President does not preclude public discussion of
the situation in

Sou~heast

Asia .

On the contra--y, it presupposes it .

The

President would be the last to expect a moratorium on public participation
of this kind .

It is politics that needs to stop at the water 's edge, not

serious consideration of the nation's course in its relations with the rest
of the world .
matter .

Rather than less, we need more public consideration of this
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The need is especially acute with respect to Southeast Asia .
Until

rccen~

times it has been an area remote

of the nation.

~rom

the geGeral

ah~eness

It is not surprising that the public, even today, knows

little about the region .

Indeed, it is doubtful that a decade ago, more

than a small fraction of the civilian and military personnel of the government and the journalists who are now immersed in its place- names could have
quickly located the Kingdom of Laos, let alone its towns and villages, on a
map of Asia.
Yet this obscure land on the borders of South China now writes
headline after headline in the daily press.

It keeps the lights on through

the night in the Pentagon, the State Department and the Cent.ral Intelligence
Agency.

It has been the immediate cause of the dispatch of United States

co~

bat forces to Thailand and a partial cause of the strengthening of the military mission in Viet Nam.

In a decade about $4oO million in U.s. military

and other aid has gone into this one nation whose population is far smaller
than that of the Detroit Metropolitan region and is scattered in jungle and
hill over an area the size of Oregon.
In 1953 when I first visited Laos, just two junior resident State
Department officials were deemed sufficient for the protection of all Un.i ted
States interests in the entire country.

A~ost

a decade later, hundreds of

officials from half a dozen federal agencies --military and civilian- -were
on the scene .
This transition in Laos highlights the transition in the United
States rela\.ionship with all of Southeast Asia.

From a minimum of contact

and cost scarcely a dozen years ago we have moved, today, to a point of
saturated involvement and immense expense .

This progressive involvement

has not been a party matter--e. republican policy or a democratic policy.
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It began under a Democratic Administration.
Republican

Ad~tnistration .

It intensified sharply under a

And it is now being dealt with once again by a

Democratic Administration .
The roots of this involvement in

Soatheas~

disploca.tion which was produced. in Asia by Ho:-ld

;:~

Asia lie in the vast
II.

But in a more

specific sense, it dates from the period of the Korean Conflict.
You will recall that about a dozen years ago revolution swept like
a giant tidal wave through China .
~orth,

into

Ko~ea .

It

sp~J~ed

over the Chinese borders in the

It gave every sigc of engulfing Indo-China to the South.

?nat region, itself, was in the midst of a mixed and confusing Communistoa~io!:alist -monarchist

upheaval, but in esser:tials, a revolution against the

reassertion of French colonial control after Horld 1/!ar II .
Engaged in the conflict in Korea, we sought for strategic reasons
to prevent Chinese expansion in Southeast Asia.

So we began to go to the

aid, first, of the French and after them, the successor governments of IndoChina- - in

Vie~

Nam, Laos and Cambodia.

The military s i tuation was eventually stabilized in Korea by
negotiations .

It was also stabilized in Indo -China largely through the

diplomacy which produced the Geneva

A~·ee~ents

of 1954.

A kind of uneasy truce settled over Asia. But there was no change
i~

the deep- seated hostility between Chinese

co~unis~

and the United States.

?eking continued to single us out as the number one enemy of the Chinese
people .

vle

continued the policy of uartime boycott of the Chinese mainland--

total economic and cultural boycott and almost total diplomatic boycott.
military situation in both the

Fo~san

Straits and Korea remained ominous .

The political situation in the divided countries of Laos and Viet Nam re~ined

unsettl ed.

The
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There followed, then, a United States effort 'vo

~eep

China out of

Southeast Asia and to forestall the spread of communism in that region .

It

was at this point that our direct involvement began to deepen in earnest.

He

embarked upon a massive military aid program to Southeast Asian nations.

All

policy was directed preponderantly to the building of
military establishments and governments.

s~rong anti- co~unist

He soug:at, further, to bring the

region under the protectiva umbrella of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization,
SEATO, which was expected to 'Clarshall nations both iV'itllin and without the area
for a common defense of the region against

comm~nisu.

In Laos and in south Viet Nam, particular.\y, the immense
sustaining the large military establishments built by
quired, in turn, large annual economic

aid-subs~dies

u.s.

cos~

of

military aid re-

to these countries.

Neither form of aid has had much effect on the economic or social well-being
of the ordinary people of these nations.

Tbe principal gain of these programs

has flowed to a relatively small number of persons in the cities and to military personnel.
In addition, to this massive military and military-support program
of aid,

som~

effort was made to help improve the lot of the ordinary people

by technical and other assistance for

eco~omic

and social development.

Finally, I should mention the extension of the information program
into Southeast Asia.

Aga:!.n, the contrast in ten years is significant. From

a minor operation confined largely to the environs of the cities of Saigon
a~d

Bangkok, the voice of America has been carried by radio and pamphlet and

motion picture, by boat, plane, jeep and foot and, I ivould presume even by
elephant, into the remotest villages and hamlets of Southeast Asia.
output of words increased massively and impressively.
did the cost tothe people of the United States .

So, too, of

The
co~·se,

- "' Over a ten-year period, the

forei~

aid-program--military and non-

milita.-y- -alone has resulted in authorized appropriations of the public fucds
of this nation of well over $3

bi~ion ~or

these Southeast Asian nations .

This total does not take into account tee salaries and expenses of the
thousands of

mil~ta:.."Y

and civilian personnel of the government ,.,ho have seen

service in the area during this period .

It does not take into account the

cost of our participation in SEATO and consequent military deployments such
as has occurred in recent weeks in and around Thailand.

It does not take

into account the cost of the expansion of the information,
other government

pl"Oe,rams

and

act~vity .

Altozether, the commitment of r esources to Southeast Asia in a
decade has been enormous by any measure .

Yet it would be a small price to

pay if it were to yield a durable peace and safeguard an opportunity for
the growth of stable free nations in that region .

Unfortunately, the ex-

perience of the past decade is not such as to give rise to sanguine expectations in this respect.
We have the experience of SEATO .
value in

fores~alling

It is difficult to assess its

military adventures by the Communists .

Perhaps it

has had some effect; perhaps it has not .

But one thing has been made very

clear by the recent military deployment .

\ve have allies under SEATO to be

sure, but allies either unwilling or unable to assume but the smallest frac tion of the burdens of the alliance .
member of SEATO .

I say that not as

cri~icism

of any

Each nation has its own problems and capacities and I do

not presume to judge them .

But this nation, too, has its problems .

And

one of them is to avoid miscalculations in policies which may derive from
the gap between the presumed promise and the actual fulfillment in any milite.ry alliance .
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Under the leader ship of President Nyo Dinh Diem, a man for whom I have
the highest r espect and the deepest

adm~ration ,

a man whose

in~e6rity

and honesty are unquestioned, and vdthout whom there would be no fret
Vietnam, that country has faced extraordinary difficulties in its
struggle for survi val.

Yet, even in • • •

~·ie hsv~

the experience, too, of Laos .

There has been eigh't years

of military and other aid of the most intensive, indeed, the most extravagant
kind to that country.

There have been millions of costly words and pictures

and sounds on the virtues of freedom and the evils of communism

d.ssemi~ated

throughout a Kingdom in vlhich, may I say, neither the concept of

;/e.s'ter~

freedom or \·!estern colL!llunism can have much meaning.

~in6dom

For it is a

isolated villagers , still living in a relatively contented, peaceful,
culture centuries old.

of

Bud~~ist

Eight years of aid and words and other operations, in

the end, have produced scarcely a ripple in Laos, except in the capita: city.
And what it pruduccd there, to say the least, does not speak well for it.
Laos is, clearly, in far more danger, today, of a collapse
co~unism

i~to

a kind of

under outside doreination or, perhaps, to division and destruction

as a nation, than when this whole process began--when the country was led by
one who tried to think and act in terms of the Kingdom's neutralism and
greater self-reliance .
vTe have the experience of Viet Nam . J!I":i this situation, after years

of

~litary

assistance of a most costly kind, it is discovered that the aid

went to build the wrong kinds of forces and that it is now necessary to build
almost from scratch with the aid of

thous~nds

of additional American training

and support forces and at an even higher level of annual aid.

It is also

discovered that a great deal more emphasis on political and economic development is now required in Viet Nam, although the need for this latter course
has been pointed out time and again in the Congress for many years.
There is no longer any escaping the fact that after years of
enormous expenditures of aid in south Viet Nam, that country is more,
rather than less, dependent on aid from the United States.

VietNam's

independent survival is less rather than more secure than it was five or

six years ago .

....

-

Once again the bombs explode in Saigon as they have

since the early days, which Professor Fishel will remember with

~e,

~o~

o~

cone

the

establishment of the Republic in 1953-55 ·
One can only hope that a similar process of increasing depencency
and increasing insecurity is not now about to begin in Thailand.
I think, in all honesty, that lTe

tr.us~

c0ntrast these

with those which exist in Burma and in Cambodia.

sitUc:~.tions

Burma has a non-communist

independence which is, at this moment, more secure than that of Laos and
Viet Nam.

Yet it has obtained little aid from us.

Cambodia has received

from us a fraction of the per capita aid which has gone to Viet Nam or Laos.
It has received aid from many countries, including Communist countries.

Yet,

its non- communist independence is certainly not less, it is far more .seccre
than that of Laos .

Indeed, it is, as of this moment, among the most peaceful

and stable of all the nations of Asia.
Now, I think we must realize that situations differ in these various
nations .

Communist and other pressures--internal and external--vary.

So do

historic and strategic circumstances. But it is not without significance in
our comprehension of the total situation in Southeast Asia that in nations in
which our aid- commitment has been relatively limited, the prospects are no
worse for the survival of non- communist independence than in those in which
we are massively committed.
Before this phenomenon can yield anything of relevance to policy,
however, we must get clearly i n mind the interests of this nation in Southeast
Asia which we are trying to protect.

For, I presume, that it is on the basis

of these inter ests t hat we have made this great commitment.

A nation's

inte~es~s

")

-

are of two

kind~--those

which are basic and

enduring and those which are transitory and peripneral.

And history indi-

cates to us that our enduring interests in Southeast Asia are limited.
also indicates to us that these limited interests tn coU!lllerce, culture and
security have been, in toe past, most
minimum involve!llent .

e~~ectively

safesuarded by a policy of

He have, in the pas·t, avoid.P.d interfering in the internal

polj.tical affa).rs of the Southeast Asian nations.

~·le

have, in the past, mini-

mizeiour military commitment on the Southeast Asian mainland--even during the
gritiJ::iest days of

lloi~ld

l·lar II .

:Je have, in the past, given appropriate en-

couragement ·to the eme:.:-gence of indepeu.dent nationhood in the region .

He have 1

in the past, sought ·to act in a fashion which would not tarnish the symbol of
freedom and human decency which this nation has long been in Asia or alienate
the friendship of the peoples of that region, r3gardless of what governments
might temporarily hold s•ray over them.

He have, in the past, through diplomacy,

sought to do our small share in the preservat).on of peace in that region as part
of our general

inte~est

in the rru:,jntene.nca of •rorld peace .

I do not se:e thaii 'Chesc enduring iutcl·es-.;:; have changed in any signific.a.nt degree .

Our cotliXIlE.rcial and cultu=c.l

still limited.

Our security interests in Southeast Asia, in terms of the de-

fense of the United States are still

ccn~ac'Cs

with Southeast Asia are

limi~ed.

Yet, it is obvious that in the past decade 'Che policy of minimum
involvement and, :i.ncidentally, minimum cost, by vrhich we have traditionally
defended these limited interests, has shifted about 180° to the point of very
deep involvement and enormous cost.
I have already pointed ou'C how the Korean conflict precipitated this
drastic change in course in Southeast Asia .
is understandable .

How we reached the present point

The question which we have not yet faced, the question

·.

- .i.O -

which may now be approaching the point of critical decisions is whether this
change is to become a permanent part of our fo=eign policy.

If it is, teen

we must be prepared., at best, to carry en annue:4 burden of several hundred
millions of dollars of military and economic subsidies to
governments in the region for many years.

enti-co~unist

He will have to do that vhether

or not they are responsive governments in terms of their own peoples needs.
We must be prepared to extend this support in Southeast Asia for the indefinite future through the whole costly mechanism of aid and propaganda.

He

must be prepared to bear the human and material cost of keeping an indeterm~oate

number of combat troops in that region, on garrison duty o= for

more serious purposes as may be necessary.
ILus·~

pared to do at best . At worst, we
of indefinite depth and duration,

All these things we must be pre-

be prepared for a possible conflict

depend.~n·c

largely on our forces for its

prosecution.
These are the facts, the realities of the situation.

Grim as

they are, I believe that it is eminently desirable that they be faced now,
whatever our decisions may be.
In all candor I must ask:

Is a permanent policy of that kind

justified on the basio of any enduring interests of the people of the United
States in Southeast Asia?

Is it more valid now, than in the past, to in-

volve ourselves in internal political situations in the countries of that
region--to maintain any government in a state of quasi-dependency on us for
the indefinite future?

Is it more valid now, than in the past, to assume

the primary burden for the political, economic and social future of these
lands?
I have raised these questions and I would anticipate that you might
raise others .

The fact is that these approaches are, at best, doubtful because

-

~-

they are immensely costly in ratio to any
of the

u.s.

in Southeast Asia.

e~during

interests of

Sou~l:.east

lit~le

to the people

Asia except a multiplics:tion of their already itim:ense social

and economic difficulties .
upon us a

people

Thay are doubtful because, in the long run,

they will yield little to the people of this nation and
of

~he

vag~e

These approaches are doubtful because tney bring

responsibility for the internal

evolu~ion

of the nations of

Southeast Asia, a responsibility which no nation can discharge for another
in this day and age, a responsibility which it is the right and duty of the
people end

le~ers

of those cations themselves to assume, a responsibility

which, after many costly decades, we relinquished in the Philippines with
no

in~ention

of assuming elsewhere .

\fuile these approaches are doub·tful, there is not assurance that
they can be avoided .

We have accumulated binding treaty commitments over

the years and integrity demands that these be honored .

Moreover, one can-

not know what other nations may do in this situation; and at this late hour
any improvement in the situation depends on
ments .

~~e

attitudes of many govern-

It depends heavily on the Chinese in Peking.

the Soviet Russian government .

It depends heavily on

It depends on political and military leaders

in Southeast Asia ann elsewhere in Asia.

Indeed, it depends on all govern-

ments which by reason of their membership in the United Nations have a
measure of responsibility for the maintenance of peace wherever it may be
threatened.
But let there be no doubt that it also depends on us.

Regardless

of these o·ther factors, it r emains for us, now, to draw clearly the distinc tion between what is enduring and basic and what is transitory and peripheral
:n our interests with respect to Southeast Asia .

It remains for us vo holn

fast to the one and seek actively to minimize the other, to the end that the

haphazard

and waste of resources in which wa have

commitmen~

indulge~

for years

in the pursuit not only of our enduring interests but of political slogans and
shibboleths may cease .
To the extent that we do what we

o~selves

must do, I believe we

shall begin to discern the basis for a new approach to policy in Southeast
Asia.

It will be an approach •,.,rhich will:
(1)

explore actively, intensely and continuously every possi-

bility of minimizing the unilateral activity of the United States in

Southeas~

Asia in every sphere;
(2)

re-examine SEATO in the light of the recent experience in

Thailand and not hesitate to attempt to modify or alter it, if other ways of
maintaining peace and independence in Southeast Asia bacome evident;

(3)

seek vigorously to diffuse, through the United Nations

or through any other feasible grouping of nations, the enormous burden of
assisting nations of Southeast Asia to bring their economies and social
structures more up- to-date;
(4)

place less emphasis on political and military subsidies,

propaganda and other devices of the cold war and more emphasis on a vigorous
and persistent trs.di tional diplomacy for the development of a more stable
situation in the area;

(5)

pay more attention to the manner in which the reasonable

needs and aspirations of the people of the nations of Southeast Asia are being
met by their governments in adjusting the whole range of our relations with
those governments;
(6)

study afresh all the political problems of the region

which contain the seeds of expanded conflict, with special attention to the
relevance of the experiences of Burma and ~ .

{!_.t'v-y~.._Lc-
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It is not
The

diff~cult~es

certa~n

that an:y of these approaches me.y be fruitful.

which he.ve been encountered on all sides in attempting

to bring about a peaceful settlement in Laos is indicative of what is involved in any significant change

fro~

the present course in Southeast Asia.

But difficulties of change, notwithstanding, the fact remains that the
present course is, as it has been for a long timA, at best, a mark- time
course of years and decades of immense cost to the people of the United
States and, at worst, it is a collision course .
It is clearly in the interests of this nation to adjust that
course if it is at all possible to do so with honor and decency.

May I

say, further 1 that this nation owes apology to no na.tj.on if it seeks to
li&~ten
~e

its

co~~t~ents

in Southeast Asia through a vigorous diplomacy- - as

have been doing with respect to Laos--and a much more discriminating aud

prudent use of its resources.

We have done our share,

to sustain friendly governments in Asia.
meet treaty

commit~ents

~

then our share

We will go on doing it.

which are binding on our honor.

We •..rill

But, at the same

time, let there be no doubt that the time is long past due when we must
explore every avenue which may lead to a situation in Southeast Asia, less
dependent on the resources of this nation for its cement.

In the search for

tre.t situation the President needs the understanding and support of the nation
e.~d

I have no doubt that it •..rill be forthcoming.

